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Highlights 
 
 Tax practice rather than being used to regulate order to bring about accountability, is used to 
resist the established order, revealing the contested nature of taxation.   
 
 Tax practice enables agents to act in accordance with anti-hegemonic norms while paying lip 
service to hegemonic norms 
 
 Culture mediates taxation practice, resulting in ‘selective enforcement’. 
 
 Anancy culture envelops tax administrators’ social being and shapes their knowledge, their 
relationships and their practices  
 
 Tax administrators use anancy culture  through anancy tactics of ‘evasive neutrality’ and 
‘mouthings’ to generate regulated behaviours which are not based on objective patterns such 
as rules. 
 
 Even though colonialism has ended, anancism continues to live through the Jamaican people 
in the form of resistance. 
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Don’t worry, we are not after you! Anancy culture and tax enforcement in Jamaica 
Abstract 
Tax administrators are agents engaged and empowered by the state, charged with 
upholding public governance in the public interest. They are specifically entrusted 
with enforcement powers to ensure that citizens are accountable to the state for 
compliance with tax laws and regulations. Yet in some instances, these state agents 
fail to do this. This paper examines tax administrators’ practices with regard to two 
categories of non-land-owning Jamaican citizens, renters and squatters. We find 
evidence of the influence of culture in the enactment of enforcement practices. 
Rather than regulating in order to bring about accountability, tax practice may be 
used to resist the established order. We conclude that Anancy culture mediates 
practices, in this case taxation, resulting in selective enforcement. Indeed, Anancy 
culture pervades the social fabric of the nation, shapes the practices of tax 
administrators, and profoundly influences struggles in the property tax field. 
 
Keywords: Anancy culture; Jamaica property tax; Selective tax enforcement; Tax 
administration practices 
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1. Introduction 
Taxation is not only a policy tool, but also a process of regulation that relies on 
accounting practices to regulate the behaviour of and give responsibility to agents. 
Our analysis of tax enforcement in Jamaica sheds light on cultural dimensions of the 
tax administration and why it may be ineffective. We explore the practices of tax 
administrators in the Jamaican property tax field and find that culture, and 
particularly ‘Anancism’, contributes to their failure to make citizens accountable and 
responsible to the established order. 
Culture is an amorphous concept, despite being well-researched across various 
disciplines (for example, see Braithwaite, 2009; Gramsci, 1971; Hofstede, 1983; 
Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952; McSweeney, 
2013; Miroshnik, 2002; Swidler, 1986). Culture runs much deeper than a ‘common 
code’, or ‘an ideological system of beliefs, ideas, or values’, which lack a ‘sense of 
agency’ (Bourdieu, 1968; Swartz, 1997: 115). We take the view that culture can 
operate as ‘a practical tool for getting along in the social world’ (Swartz, 1997: 115), 
and that its practices constitute struggles for symbolic resources (Swartz, 1997: 6). In 
particular, we show how culture mediates practice in the context of Anancy culture, 
a cultural system of values and morals in opposition to the British imperialistic 
system (see Chevannes, 2006; DeSouza, 2003: 353; Eriksen, 2013; Forsythe, 1980; 
Marshall, 2001, 2006, 2009, 2012; Seaga, 2005). 
Tax administrators are agents engaged and empowered by the state, charged 
with responsibility for upholding public governance in the public interest. They are 
specifically entrusted with powers of tax enforcement through tax regulations, to 
ensure that citizens are accountable to the state through compliance and payment 
of their fair share of taxes. However, these state agents do not always fulfil their 
responsibilities. Whilst tax scholarship alludes to national culture as a contributing 
factor (Alm & Martinez-Vazquez, 2003; Bird, 2004; Bird & De Jantscher, 1992; 
Mansfield, 1988; Nerré, 2008; Oats & Sadler, 2011; Richardson & Lanis, 1999; 
Vázquez-Caro & Bird, 2011), it provides little insight into how culture influences tax 
administration practices to ensure taxpayer accountability. 
This paper seeks to fill this scholarly silence by considering why tax 
administrations fail to make citizens accountable, through the case of Jamaican 
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3 
property tax enforcement. Our examination of the practices of tax administrators in 
respect of two particular categories of non-land-owning Jamaican citizens, renters 
and squatters, reveals the influence of culture on enforcement practices. Tax 
administrators exhibit Anancy characteristics and strategies in their dealings with 
these groups. 
The paper makes three important contributions. First, it links Anancy culture to 
tax enforcement practices in the case country, and thereby extends the limited 
extant literature on tax administration and culture in the Jamaican context. Second, 
the paper complements the literature on regulatory practices in the tax field 
(Braithwaite, 2003, 2006, 2009; Gracia & Oats, 2012), and in particular the practices 
of tax administrators (Björklund Larsen, 2013, 2015; Boll, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Tuck, 
2010). In this way, we provide a more nuanced understanding of the hidden 
influence of culture on taxation practices. Finally, the paper contributes to 
accounting scholarship that sees the tax field as a site of social struggle, highlighting 
that accounting practices, including taxation, are not merely technical, but also 
social, organizational and institutional (Boden, Killian, Mulligan, & Oats, 2010; Gracia 
& Oats, 2012; Miller, 1994: Miller & Power, 2013; Mulligan & Oats, 2015). 
We find that, rather than being used to regulate order and bring about 
accountability, tax practices are used to resist the established order, and in doing so 
fail to make citizens accountable to it, revealing the contested nature of taxation. 
The paper reveals that tax practices enable agents to act in accordance with anti-
hegemonic norms while paying lip service to hegemonic norms. We conclude that 
culture mediates practices, in this case taxation, resulting in ‘selective enforcement’. 
In this regard, culture envelops agents in a social fabric that shapes their knowledge, 
how they relate to each other, and their beliefs (Braithwaite, 2009: 32). 
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 provides an overview of Jamaican 
history, institutions and culture, including land tenure practices, providing a 
background to the specific case of property tax enforcement. Section 3 outlines the 
empirical work, Section 4 provides our analysis, and Section 5 concludes with some 
discussion. 
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2. Jamaica: history, institutions and culture 
Jamaica’s culture and institutions have been shaped by over three hundred 
years of British colonization and slavery. The period of slavery under colonization 
was particularly arduous. To bring about change, slaves and ex-slaves resorted to 
both overt and covert resistance. Overt resistance occurred in the form of open 
rebellions, such as burning of estates, demonstrations and riots (Oats, Sadler, & 
Wynter, 2014), to bring about changes in practice (Braithwaite, 2009; Bourne, 2010). 
Indeed, the transition from Crown Colony government to independence in 1962 was 
a result of citizens’ demonstrations (see Smith, 1984). However, one downside of 
this type of violence was the level of fear it induced in the social space (Goulbourne, 
1984). Covert resistance, on the other hand, took the form of Anancism, a display of 
practices and attitudes in opposition to the British imperialistic system, which we 
explain more fully below. As Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 80) observe, ‘the 
dominated, in any social universe, can always exert a certain force’. 
Jamaica has been a stable democracy since independence in 1962, although it 
has experienced fiscal strain resulting in interventions by international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and world development agencies such as the IMF and the World 
Bank. Despite independence, Jamaica remains culturally stratified between 
Eurocentric practices and subordinate African practices, ‘making the country a well-
defined model of a dual society’ (Seaga, 2005: 79). 
Jamaican bureaucracy, including the public service within which the tax 
administration falls, evolved from the British system (Mills & Robertson, 1974). 
Within the last five decades or so, attempts have been made through assistance, 
loans and grants from IFIs to reform both the structural conditions and the 
organizational practices of the public service (see CaPRI, 2011; Chaudhry, Reid, & 
Malik, 1994; Isaacs, 2002; Mills, 1997; Mills & Slyfield, 1987; Moloney & Chu, 2016; 
Tindigarukayo, 2004b). Despite these reforms, it is suggested that the public service 
continues to be ‘rooted in its colonial past’ (Bakre, 2008; Mills & Robertson, 1974). 
According to Tindigarukayo (2004b: 88-89), as soon as the reform projects ended, 
the public servants reverted to their old ways. For example, they continued to 
exhibit a lack of ownership, commitment and responsibility, and showed little 
genuine support for the reforms, arguably because they believed them to be threats 
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to their employment. Mills and Robertson (1974) argue that the Jamaican public 
service is characterized by strategies such as passing the buck and shirking 
responsibility, which are traits of Anancism (DeSouza, 2003; Chevannes, 2006; 
Marshall, 2001, 2006, 2009, 2012; Seaga, 2005). 
We argue that the tax administrators’ disposition is to some extent a reflection 
of the Jamaican national disposition, specifically ‘the Anancy Syndrome’ (Marshall, 
2001: 128, citing Barrett, 1976: 33). The Anancy Syndrome is ‘a countercultural or 
subcultural system of moral values’, or attitudes, values, strategies and dispositions 
that promote or engage in ‘resistance to the established order’ with a view to 
changing the social order, not destroying it (see Araya, 2014; Chevannes, 2006; 
Deandrea, 2004; DeSouza, 2003: 353; Eriksen, 2013; Forsythe, 1980; Marshall, 2001, 
2006, 2009; Seaga, 2005; Vecsey, 1981). We argue that the established order is the 
British imperial system of property tax legislation to which tax administrators are 
expected to make taxpayers accountable. We also argue that the Anancy Syndrome, 
like any other aspect of national culture, whether ‘the institutionalization of 
corruption, standards of public morality and the attitude towards compliance of 
peers’, influences tax enforcement practices (see, for example, Bird, 2004: 138). 
Anancism evolved from African folklore, and has been influential in the 
evolution of Jamaican culture (see Abrahams, 1967: 462; Bostic, 2014; Chevannes, 
2006; Deandrea, 2004; DeSouza, 2003; Forsythe, 1980; Marshall, 2001, 2006, 2009, 
2012; Seaga, 2005). Anancy is connected with the African Asante religion, which is 
based on the worship of spiritual forces that structure the world and the universe. 
Within this religion, Anancy is an intermediary agent occupying a liminal space 
between the worlds of the gods and humans. Between these two boundaries, 
transformation occurs. Anancy’s occupation of this space gives him the capacity to 
invert all social rules, as he is bound by the codes of neither humans nor the spirit 
world. He therefore breaks all the rules of acceptable conduct, confronting and 
deceiving the Asante God (see Marshall, 2012: 20), restructuring both worlds, and 
showing no fear of crossing the boundaries (Marshall 2012: 29–31). Anancy ‘erodes 
binary oppositions and challenges clear perceptions of  good and evil’ (Marshall, 
2006: 11); thus, Anancism provides an important lens through which to explore the 
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6 
‘interplay of complex contradictions, conflicts and tensions’ (ibid) within Jamaican 
society. 
Anancy is known as the Great Spider trickster god (Marshall, 2001), and his link 
with the divine is reflected in the ‘art of spinning and the art of narrating’ (Deandrea, 
2004). Since Anancy’s migration to the Caribbean, he has been transformed from the 
deity (Marshall, 2001) and has taken on additional features. In particular, he 
‘symbolized the plight of the underprivileged slaves and then later as a people 
struggling to assert their identity’ (Rampaul, 2013: 315). Anancy also ‘symbolizes 
resistance in the face of imperialism and globalization, signifying an unsanitized 
version of the history and nature of the Jamaican society and culture’ (Marshall, 
2001: 133). 
In the Jamaican social space, Anancy has become a ‘symbolic representation of 
the Jamaican national disposition’ (Marshall, 2001, citing Barrett, 1976). This 
disposition is reinforced in the education system through readings of Anancy stories 
in schools and at social and cultural gatherings.1 These stories carry messages that 
violate taboos and break social rules, but nevertheless have a moral and aetiological 
meaning (Deandrea, 2004: 2). 
Metaphorically, Anancism ‘communicates vicarious freedom from societal 
boundaries’, calling into question British imperialistic institutions by simultaneously 
breaking, probing and proving their rules (Vecsey, 1981: 174). Anancism also 
demonstrates ‘the play of the imperial colonial differences’, and scoffs at the notion 
that colonial laws are supreme (Araya, 2014, citing Mignola, 2002). Although the 
influence of Anancy on agents’ dispositions displays certain common characteristics, 
the true test of Anancy’s corporeal existence is empirical, as Anancism ‘resists fixed 
definitions and interpretations’ (Marshall, 2006: 11). Thus, we argue that Anancism 
may generate different, and even opposite, reactions in different settings. 
Displays of Anancism include ‘outsmarting, outwitting … and exercising a level of 
independent agency even in a social context in which power is monopolized by a 
specific dominant class’ (Bostic, 2014: 54). In this context, Anancy is predisposed to 
                                                     
1
 Retrieved from http://louisebennett.com/anancy-and-sorrel-louise-bennett-coverley/. See also 
Marshall, 2006. 
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7 
consider himself as ‘the genius of the field’ (Bates, 1896: 121), where ‘brain triumphs 
over power’ (Doumeric, 2003: 80) and ‘power resides in the mind rather than in the 
body’ (Araya, 2014). Therefore, within the Anancy value system, the ultimate traits 
for successful resistance are ‘cunning, patience and diplomacy’ (Chevannes, 2006: 
153). However, the literature suggests that we should not lose sight of the fact that 
Anancy is a ‘schemer, an artist of psychological warfare’ (Forsythe, 1980: 67), ‘a 
master quasi-manipulator with two opposing personalities, who can simultaneously 
ingress and egress’ (Chevannes, 2006: 147–148). 
Anancy morals are such that survival and maintaining one’s position take 
precedence over loyalty, piety and truth; also, pragmatism is valued above a 
principled stance (Forsysthe, 1980: 68). Therefore, little respect or regard is given to 
the legal ethics, moral conventions or social restraints of the dominant system 
(Araya, 2014). Agents execute whatever mode of actions they consider necessary to 
survive, maintain and preserve their position in the field (see Chevannes, 2006; 
Forsythe, 1980; Marshall, 2009). In other words, Anancy culture shapes the rules of 
the game. 
Anancism thrives best in fields with ‘relationships of antagonism and boundary 
maintenance’ (Chevannes, 2006: 147–148). Thus, it is most effective in situations of 
superordination or subordination because its power lies in its ability to violate the 
established order through subversiveness. Jamaica is a dual society: according to 
Chevannes (2006: 147–148), ‘most Jamaicans are able to operate in two worlds, two 
orders, moving the boundaries back and forth as they see fit’. However, for 
Chevannes, this is not an ‘aberration, but quite a wholesome and functional order 
based on the world view that for all the several hundred years of evolution is neither 
recognized, understood or valued by those agents who control the maintenance of 
the hegemonic order’ (ibid.). Several authors suggest that Anancism is 
‘institutionalized and personalized’, permeating all social structures in Jamaican 
society (Chevannes, 2006; Doumeric, 2003; Seaga, 2005). 
We argue that Anancism is relatively resilient and embodied within Jamaicans, 
including its tax administrators, and is second nature for some Jamaicans. In this 
paper, we show how, despite holding legitimate enforcement authority to impose 
compliance on renters and squatters by making them responsible and accountable 
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8 
to the state, the influence of Anancism on tax administrators’ practices leads to their 
failure to enforce compliance. In other cultures, this might be perceived as unethical, 
but in Jamaica, non-enforcement by tax administrators ties in with the Anancy 
Syndrome of agents operating within two orders, moving the boundaries as they see 
fit (Chevannes, 2006: 147–148; Marshall, 2012: 20–31). 
Central to this paper is the Jamaican property tax, a land value tax, the 
imposition of which hinges on land ownership and, importantly, occupation. 
Following emancipation, the British government decided against a formal and 
orderly relocation of ex-slaves from the estates in order to protect planters’ supply 
of labour, and decreed that facilities for emancipated slaves to obtain land be 
diminished (see Clarke, 1999: 16). This did not dampen the spirit of the ex-slaves: 
most left the plantations, and some were fortunate enough to purchase properties, 
while others rented or squatted (Tindigarukayo, 2002). These latter two categories 
of land occupiers may be liable to property tax, even though they do not have legal 
title to the land, and these categories of taxpayer are the focus of this paper. 
Renters were often at a disadvantage compared with those who purchased land 
or squatted because they ostensibly remained on the plantations, necessitating 
continuous interface with their previous masters with whom relations were poor 
(Black, 1969: 171; Bolland, 1996: 110; Marshall, 1996; Mintz, 1996). Furthermore, 
their rental agreements were ‘coercive, discriminatory … and arguably functioned as 
systems of domination to keep them on the estates’ (Bolland, 1996: 108–111). These 
agreements became a source of bitterness between planters and ex-slaves (Black, 
1969). 
Owning land is highly valued by all Jamaicans, and they will arguably go to any 
lengths to own property, including squatting (Tindigarukayo, 2002). Squatting, or 
illicit occupation of property, has been a social and political dilemma for successive 
governments since 1866 (Tindigarukayo, 2002, 2014). The colonial governments and 
all subsequent governments have used legislation to regulate this practice, including 
the Limitations of Action Act 1881 (LAA), which includes an adverse possession rule 
that allows occupiers to obtain title to land (ownership) under certain conditions. 
The main condition is unmolested occupation of land for a minimum of 12 years in 
case of private ownership, together with payment of property tax for the land. For 
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9 
Crown lands, the term of unmolested occupation is 60 years, and payment of 
property tax is not required to secure title. Whilst this is an established route 
through which the socially and economically disadvantaged can obtain ownership of 
property, it is also a source of discontent and is held in contempt by a large section 
of the Jamaican community.2 
Jamaica’s rich cultural heritage, with its mix of European colonization and 
slavery, African traditions and neoliberal values, is an interesting case through which 
to explore the influence of Anancy culture and how it shapes selective tax 
enforcement practices. This backdrop of Jamaica’s cultural heritage, administrative 
practices and land ownership traditions thus allows us to explore property tax and its 
(non-)enforcement. 
Jamaican property tax, a centrally-managed, land-based tax, was introduced by 
Britain in 1903 and is payable by ‘owners, occupiers, mortgagors or other persons in 
actual possession of property when the tax becomes due and payable’.3 It is 
dedicated to local authorities, and funds local amenities such as garbage collection, 
street lighting and community beautification. The property tax has a chequered 
history, having being tinged with discriminatory practices, particularly during the 
early emancipation years (Bolland, 1996). 
Although the property tax is an ostensibly insignificant source of national 
revenue, it may be viewed as a significant symbol of contribution to society (Bird & 
Slack, 2006; Daunton, 2007; Ellis, Kopanyi, & Lee, 2006; Fjeldstad & Moore, 2008), 
yet it is imbued with historical connections to British rule (Andelson, 2000; Clarke, 
1999; Bolland, 1996; Marshall, 1996) and is considered by some to be strategically 
important for economic development (Norregaard, 2013). 
The property tax field is an arena of struggle in which enforcement and 
compliance are often contested issues between the state and taxpayers. Agents 
compete over legitimate interpretation of the rules by which the state articulates 
the mechanisms of property tax payment and collection. Owing to the pervasive and 
all-encompassing nature of property tax (Guth, Levati, & Sausgrubber, 2005), it 
                                                     
2
 http://antheamcgibbon.com/jamaican-squatters-and-their-rights-to-title-depossess-owner.htm/ 
3
 See Section 4 of the Property Tax Act (1903). 
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10 
overlaps with many other social fields, such as land tenure practices, planning and 
bureaucracy. Tax administrators in the property tax field are influenced by and 
influence these overlapping fields to varying degrees, as we demonstrate below. 
In the property tax field, tax administrators are legitimized by the state to 
administer legislation to ensure that all taxpayers are accountable to the state for 
property tax.4 Legitimation provides state empowerment and the resources needed 
to enforce compliance, but simultaneously suggests that tax administrators 
themselves are subject to state regulation (Miller & Power, 2013). In this regard, we 
argue that, as public servants, although they are in a dominated position in that they 
are answerable to the state, they are set apart as agents of the state to act on its 
behalf in the public interest and execute their duties professionally. This suggests 
that they are also in a dominant position in relation to taxpayers. According to the 
property tax rules, all occupiers of property must pay property tax, and if they fail to 
comply, then it is the responsibility of Tax Administration Jamaica (TAJ) to enforce 
compliance. 
3 Methodology 
The analysis presented here is informed largely by unstructured, in-depth 
interviews, each of which began with an exploration of property tax practices. Thirty-
two semi-structured, face-to-face interviews involving 45 participants were 
conducted by the first author in 2012 and 2013. Clarification of issues raised was 
subsequently sought from some interviewees through email, social media and 
telephone. Some of these interviewees hold or held senior positions in the property 
tax field (see Appendix for a list of interviewees). The interviewees were deliberately 
sought out, or ‘purposively sampled’, based on their knowledge, expertise and 
experience in the subject being studied (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 24; Silverman, 
2013). 
One challenge of conducting interviews dealing with property tax in a country 
like Jamaica is encouraging interviewees to comment on research issues that may 
implicate their personal circumstances. This is due partly to the culture of property 
ownership, and the varying levels of emphasis placed on it. We used interviews to 
                                                     
4
 In addition to the LAA, through the Property Tax Act 1903, Tax Collection Act 1867, Registration of 
Title Act 1889 and Trespass Act 1851. 
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gain insights from ‘the lived experience of agents in order to explicate the categories 
of perception and appreciation that structure their action from inside’ (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992: 11). Each interview lasted an average of an hour, ranging from 20 
minutes to 2½ hours. They explored patterns of Anancy values and other issues 
relating to regularities of the field in the context of culture, and how tax 
administrators sought to bring about accountability in their tax enforcement 
practices. Significantly, issues relating to culture and Anancy disposition 
reverberated throughout the interviews, enabling us to develop a coherent picture 
of Anancy culture in tax enforcement practices. 
Access to renters was challenging. However, a group of squatters agreed to be 
interviewed because they saw it as an opportunity to air their concerns about land 
tenure issues and property tax, believing that the interviews would assist their quest 
to obtain legal title to land. 
In the first stage of analysis, we identified instances in the interviews where the 
informants discussed land tenure practices, property rights and land title issues, 
cultural environment, enforcement resources, renters, squatters and compliance 
practices. Further analysis produced insights into conditions and dynamics of the 
field, including relations between agents, their positions, and displays of Anancism 
by tax administrators (Chevannes, 2006; Marshall, 2001, 2006, 2009, 2012). 
4. Property tax enforcement 
We found evidence of a pervasive non-compliance culture, manifested in a low 
average compliance rate of 50 per cent, and less than 30 per cent for some parishes 
(Wynter, 2014), suggesting that TAJ was failing to carry out its duty to enforce 
compliance against all taxpayers. This was not lost on other agents in the field, and 
participants gave many narrative accounts of this issue. For example, one former 
senior tax administrator (18) stated ‘there’s not much enforcement’, implying that 
TAJ was abdicating its duty. Another interviewee, a taxpayer (28A), said that TAJ’s 
approach to ‘collecting property tax is not that serious. So we all get away … you can 
owe for some years and nobody will bother you … there seems not to be any strict 
measurement of collection’. Another taxpayer (32), speaking of TAJ’s non-
enforcement, stated ‘my co-worker has not paid property tax in more than seven 
years, and no letter was written to him, nobody came to him and tell him that he 
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wasn’t complying with the property tax’, implying that the administrators were 
derelict in carrying out their duties. A legislator (05) described TAJ as a ‘do nothing’ 
organization: ‘They shy away from making decisions … they do nothing because they 
don’t want to be wrong. If you do nothing, nobody can say you do anything wrong.’ 
These statements suggest that TAJ was failing to use taxation as an intervening 
device to modify the non-compliant behaviour of a significant number of taxpayers 
to make them accountable and responsible to the state through payment of tax 
(Miller & Power, 2013). 
Some 21 per cent of the Jamaican population live in rented properties, with a 
larger percentage in urban areas (Nadelman, 2009), while 33 per cent live in squatter 
settlements (United Nations, 2016; Tindigarukayo, 2014). However, despite these 
large numbers, according to one senior tax administrator (14A), no routine 
enforcement is carried out on renters and squatters. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that residential renters do not usually pay property 
tax. Participants expressed conflicting opinions on whether renters should pay this 
tax. The property tax rules make it clear that a tax liability falls on anyone in actual 
possession of the property concerned, including the renter (see Property Tax Act). 
Conflating the question of the benefits of renting in the housing market and the 
payment of property tax, a former councillor (19) argued that renting residential 
properties was a means of building the community and utilizing unoccupied 
properties (see also Black, 1969). However, one taxpayer (27) stated that TAJ should 
‘ensure that wherever or whoever occupies a particular property, that those persons 
are assessed for property tax, and if they don’t pay, the normal collection compliance 
situation should apply’. This view was also supported by another taxpayer (29), who 
suggested that TAJ should enforce compliance regardless of conditions in the 
property tax field, even under the threat of violence (Goulbourne, 1984): ‘Don’t 
come to me because of who I am and [not] go to the next person down there because 
they will fire shot, target everybody.’ 
One difference between renters and squatters is that the legislation provides for 
renters to deduct property tax from rental payments owing to the landlord and pay 
this over to the tax authority. However, squatters do not have this provision; as they 
have no landlord, they are expected to pay from their own pockets. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
13 
As confirmed by one Cabinet minister (01), the possibility of obtaining title to 
property lures squatters into paying property tax. More sophisticated squatters 
search the land registry, identify people who are not paying property tax, take 
physical possession of the land through fencing, and then pay the tax. One 
respondent (31A) who had been squatting for almost thirty years, and had lobbied 
on behalf of his community for land title through adverse possession, confirmed this 
cultural practice: ‘if one occupies land and then pays the tax for the land over a 
period of time and no one claims the land, you can claim the land’. Another (31C), 
who had been squatting for almost 40 years, said ‘well, we have the land already’, 
meaning they were in actual possession, that the land really belonged to them, and 
it was only of matter of obtaining legal title to the property. However, property tax is 
an issue: ironically, none of the squatters interviewed had ever paid property tax. 
Pursuit of legal title through adverse possession requires Certificates of Payment of 
Property Tax for at least twelve years, which the squatters were unable to produce.5 
Along with four others in a group of six squatters interviewed, they had never paid, 
but expressed their willingness to pay property tax if enforcement action were 
taken. Despite their willingness to pay, TAJ does not enforce their tax payments, 
arguing that the adverse possession rule does not function as it did many years ago. 
Thus, it has moved the boundaries to suit its perception, which is typical of Anancism 
(Chevannes, 2006). 
Although recent court cases have clarified that the adverse possession rule is 
still in operation, it is becoming an increasingly vexed issue in Jamaican society.6 In a 
recent Privy Council case, Pottinger v. Raffone 2007,7 a squatter, a former custos,8 
                                                     
5
 S43 of the LAA makes payment of property tax mandatory, regardless of the status of occupation; 
thus, squatters are required to produce evidence that they have paid property tax while in 
occupation. 
6
 http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20160515/squatters-must-quit-security-minister-
vows-take-aim-squatting 
7
 UKPC 22. Retrieved from http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/2007/22.html/ Accessed 31 July 
2017. 
8
 The Office of Custos relates to Jamaica’s colonial past appointed to assist in maintaining law and 
order.  It is a civic post recognized in England and Jamaica. The custos is the Governor General’s 
representative at the parish level and the Chief Magistrate of the parish.  The custos also performs 
ceremonial roles like meeting the Judge of the Circuit Court at the opening session.  Sometimes a 
custos may serve as President of the Lay Magistrates Association. 
See also http://moj.gov.jm/services-and-information/custodes/ Accessed  18 January 2018. 
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14 
cleared and fenced land adjoining his property, paid the property tax and 
successfully claimed legal title to the property. This case is significant owing to its 
political sensitivity: the squatter was a prominent social and political figure in the 
government, with extensive social networks both within the parish and across the 
entire island. Unsurprisingly, this squatter also had extensive knowledge of both the 
British colonial rules and the colloquial culture in relation to land tenure practices, as 
well as economic capital. According to one informant, a former councilor (19), the 
case embarrassed the government, and it was kept quiet while being litigated 
through the courts. A participant’s view was that this squatter’s actions were 
dishonest and strategic, suggesting that he was not only cunning but also a schemer, 
showing Anancism at play (Chevannes, 2006; Marshall, 2012). 
The custos, as chief magistrate of the parish, acts as an agent of the state, 
representing the Governor General at parish level,9 and is expected to be compliant 
with the law. However, in order to obtain property, this individual used local 
Jamaican land tenure practice, which runs counter to the established order 
(Tindigarukayo, 2002).10 One view could be that the custos’ action in obtaining 
property by colloquial means is typical of the practice of some politicians of 
disobeying the law while pretending to obey it, confirming Seaga’s (2005) view that 
Anancism is not confined to Jamaicans from the lower socio-economic class. 
Disregard of the established order by prominent figures like the custos demonstrates 
Anancy’s liminality, an ability to operate simultaneously within two orders, achieving 
goals by simultaneously representing and portraying an image of upholding or 
paying lip service to the law, while practising a local culture that opposes the 
established rules (Chevannes, 2006; Doumeric, 2003: 155–157;11 Marshall, 2009, 
2012; Seaga, 2005). 
Like other politicians, the custodes12 are able to operate in two orders by 
‘disconnecting themselves from their original identity and surroundings’ (Marshall 
2012: 32, citing Glazier, 1998), becoming accountable to whichever order suits their 
                                                     
9
 See also http://moj.gov.jm/services-and-information/custodes/ Accessed 3 August 2017. The 
Governor General is Her Majesty’s representative in Jamaica. 
10
 The Trespass Act 1851 precludes entering private land without lawful authority. 
11
 Document No 27 ‘Anancy as national hero’, written by Peter Espeut. 
12
 Custodes is the plural of custos.  See also footnotes 8 & 9 
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present need, and revealing the slippery nature of accountability. Their actions 
reflect the symbolism of Anancy ‘disconnecting his own body parts, changing his sex, 
eating his children, abusing guests and ignoring the truth’ (Marshall, 2012:32), in 
keeping with the Anancy culture of being pragmatic, and doing whatever it takes to 
get by in the social world (Araya, 2014; Forsysthe, 1980). Whilst the custos’ action 
may be seen as running against establishment norms, the result was improvement in 
tax compliance through payment of property tax, and so a positive cultural norm 
emerged. 
As noted earlier, Jamaica is a stable democracy, and yet there seems to be a 
level of ambivalence toward and disregard of law enforcement and compliance 
(Boxill, 1995), which may be construed as features of Anancism (Araya, 2014). The 
British derived law is clear: anyone who comes into actual possession, or is no longer 
in actual possession or occupation, is required to advise either the National Land 
Agency (NLA) or TAJ for tax purposes. This often does not happen. According to one 
senior bureaucrat (06), ‘this is a country where law and order and the rule of law 
doesn’t apply’ (see Dawson, 2013; Dick, 2009). This behaviour may appear to some 
as consistent with the Anancy Syndrome, ignoring the legal and moral obligations of 
the dominant system (Araya, 2014); but is this really the case? Jamaicans perceive 
laws as merely symbolic gestures to be circumvented, not to be obeyed but to be 
broken, as observed by another senior bureaucrat (07): 
Now, when you pass laws, it doesn’t mean a thing because the people who 
are passing the laws are not interested in the enforcement of it. They pass it 
to say they can pass the law; and everybody now, those of us sitting down 
looking at it, say, ‘Yeah man, what a “wicked” [excellent/good] law they’re 
passing.’ But guess what happen: me know Jimmy and me know Boogie and 
me know Spoogie. You see, anyhow they try to apply this law against me, me 
going to go to Boogie, or Spoogie or one of them to get a bly (07).13 
This participant (07) further stated that lawlessness and corruption permeate 
social and institutional structures, including those in the property tax field, as 
                                                     
13
 ‘Bly’ is Jamaican slang for giving a chance (see http://jamaicanpatwah.com/ 
term/Bly/918#.WVZfhGWXjFI/). 
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evidenced by the level of non-compliance. Several interviewees (04, 14B, 25, 30) 
stated that some Jamaicans even refuse to pay for social services such as electricity 
and water. Where property tax payment is concerned, it was reported that some 
politicians (16) and large land barons are among those who do not pay property tax 
(08, 17B, 25). We argue that agents living in this environment cannot be immune to 
these influences. 
Tax administrators are historical agents who carry within their bodies acquired 
sensibilities and categories that are sedimented products of their past social 
experiences (Wacquant, 2011) as well as their current experiences. The concept of 
the Anancy Syndrome provides some understanding of how some tax administrators 
have naturalized their enforcement practice as a consequence of these social 
influences and interactions in the field (Grenfell, 2014). We argue that some tax 
administrators internalize Anancism in paying lip service to the law, shifting 
boundaries to suit their circumstances, and simultaneously operating within two 
orders. 
As socially constituted agents, tax administrators are empowered by the law, 
possessing the necessary cultural knowledge to produce the desired effects to bring 
about compliance. However, this does not always happen. Knowledge of the field in 
which tax administrators evolve ‘allows us best to grasp the roots of their singularity, 
their point of view from which their particular vision of the world is constructed’ 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 107). In this context, we describe evidence from the 
field in relation to tax administrators’ struggle to change the property tax rules using 
the Anancy tactics of evasive neutrality, and mouthing or misleading utterances. We 
consider each of these in turn. 
4.1 Evasive neutrality 
A key theme emerging from the interviews was tax administrators’ ‘evasive 
neutrality’, a feature of Anancy tactics (Chevannes, 2006: 145) whereby agents 
portray themselves as victims of their external circumstances in order to avoid 
responsibility (Marshall, 2009: 138). We found evidence of this in relation to non-
enforcement on renters. Tax administrators’ evasive neutrality was visible in their 
playing the blame game and making excuses as to why they could not enforce 
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against renters. In particular, they blamed a lack of buy-in and suggested that they 
might be victims of violence (see Black, 1969; Goulbourne, 1984; Harriott, 2003; Oats 
et al., 2014; Seaga, 2005). 
Tax administrators are obliged by law to enforce compliance on renters who do 
not pay property tax to the state, and they acknowledge this responsibility. As 
previously mentioned, there are large numbers of renters; however, according to 
one senior tax administrator (16), the dynamics of the field preclude enforcement 
because ‘some [renters] live at their relatives’ place and they don’t have any money 
to pay rent’. If there is no money to pay rent, then there is no money for property 
tax; thus, it is pointless to enforce compliance. There is also a larger issue of whether 
the Jamaican population would accept enforcement against renters, raising the 
question of whether this is ‘something that Jamaicans would accept, that you go to a 
tenant and collect from a tenant?’ (14A). 
Enforcement against renters might lead to retribution and, in this regard, a 
senior tax administrator stated that, if we enforce, ‘we would get the back end of the 
stick’ (10). Furthermore, enforcement against renters may precipitate ‘“we want 
justice”14 swimming up to the top. And if that swims up to the top, you are going to 
have a problem’, with a further argument that the mobilization of social capital into 
people power makes it impossible for enforcement to take place: 
People power is always greater than legislative power. It has always been and 
it will ever be and it will never change. So no matter how you legislate to 
collect from people, if the society does not accept it, they are going to throw it 
back at you (14A). 
A history of resistance to payment pervades the property tax field (Marshall, 
1996). For example, in 1848 in the parish of St Mary, tax collectors attempted to 
enforce compliance on a group of renters but were unable to collect because of the 
community’s violent response.15 The collectors were attacked by the entire 
community and beaten with stones and sticks, forcing them to seek medical 
attention. Although tax administrators are no longer attacked while carrying out 
                                                     
14
 Popular slogan used in Jamaica in public demonstrations when people feel aggrieved. Retrieved 
from http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Fiery-demonstration-on-Orange-Street/. 
15
 Retrieved from https://sniggle.net/TPL/index5.php?entry=07Oct13/. 
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their duties, the past experience of resistance remains part of the tax culture, even 
though the rules of collection have changed over time. 
Another issue concerns the landlord’s reaction if the tenant deducts the 
property tax from the rent and pays it over to the tax authority. One senior tax 
administrator (10) stated that the law gives inadequate direction as to what will 
happen to the tenant, arguing that ‘the law should have gone further [to explain] if 
the renter pays on behalf of the landlord, then the landlord should not be able to 
penalize or harass the tenant’. Participant (14A) also complained that, since the 
property tax rules do not specify whether the landlord may still insist on getting the 
full rent from the renter, TAJ is reluctant to enforce in this scenario. This participant 
continued: 
I don’t know. You understand? So we are saying that maybe, then, ask for the 
law to be modified and state that you can offset it against the rent…  Because 
how it is put, I don’t know if you can just offset it against the rent. That’s my 
personal view on it (14A). 
We argue that the amorality of the Spider God kicks in, and evasive neutrality 
takes over. Metaphorically, this is similar to ‘the Spider waiting patiently, just 
spinning his web, waiting to trap an errant fly’ (Chevannes, 2006: 145). But what is 
happening here is that agents are attempting to play the victim role by just sitting, 
complaining and refusing to take responsibility to gain sympathy for their non-
enforcement through their blame games and excuses. 
The respondents’ comments also suggested that tax administrators had no 
intention of effecting enforcement against renters. As Chevannes (2006: 144) argues, 
‘intention is the subjective orientation of agents and if the outcome is not what is 
intended, then agents are not morally responsible’. Although British imperialistic 
values accept that this is so, ‘it does not absolve the agent as blameless, if the 
sequence of his/her action leads to injury’ (ibid.). The difference in the Jamaican 
context is that, even though they do not enforce compliance and the government 
loses revenues, they are not held responsible; the agents’ perception is that ‘their 
personal worlds are shaped by forces that interact with their will to produce results 
that are not entirely their responsibility’, and in this regard they fail to internalize 
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responsibility (Chevannes, 2006: 145). Thus, by playing the victim role and blame 
games and making excuses, agents are saying that they have no control over what 
happens in the field: events are ‘uncontrollable’, they can do nothing, and they 
cannot enforce. 
4.2  Changing the rules through mouthings 
The second key theme that emerged from the interviews was a sense that tax 
administrators engage in Anancism in the form of mouthing (Chevannes, 2006; 
Forsythe, 1980). Mouthing is used as a way of contesting the social order through 
probing and breaking the principles, which is a natural and normal response for 
those seeking to resist the state. This is most clearly visible in the case of squatters. 
Anancy’s link with the divine is reflected in the ‘art of spinning and identified 
with the art of narrating’ (Deandrea, 2004). Spinning of the web represents Anancy’s 
ability to narrate: Anancy working with his mouth, shifting his mouth and tongue, 
throwing words, guessing, exaggerating or distorting information are used as 
weapons or instruments to contest the social order, not to destroy it but to modify it 
(Forsythe, 1980: 76; Marshall, 2009). 
Evidence from our study suggests that tax administrators’ use of mouthings is a 
means to break with, probe and prove the issue of squatting in an attempt to 
normalize non-enforcement against squatters. Although the adverse possession rule 
normalizes squatting after 12 years of undisturbed occupation, this issue remains an 
area of disquiet amongst some registered landowners who fear they may lose their 
property. We therefore argue that tax administrators’ mouthings are based on social 
influences; they are influenced by agents’ behaviour, attitudes, opinions and 
interactions with other agents in the field. 
Through the tactic of mouthing, tax administrators denounce the state for the 
unfair timing of the adverse possession rule, and also argue that it serves the 
interest of politicians to use squatting as a means of providing land to squatters: 
It suits the politicians to make people squat on people’s land, it suits them 
politically and then take it after twelve years… Government has no right to 
put in the law that you pay for people’s land and you get it after 12 years... 
That was part of the colonial way of taking away people’s land. And it needs 
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to change (14B). 
Like Anancy, tax administrators are quick-witted and nimble in their comments 
against politicians, the purported defenders of property tax rules. They chide the 
state for asking them to enforce compliance on squatters, as enforcement gives the 
impression that they support the adverse possession rule, which they consider to be 
an act of dishonesty. In the words of one senior administrator: 
Should the state be taking the same route as the dishonest man? You see, I 
am very cautious of taking a compliance action, and when people look at it, 
they don’t see a distinction between it and a dishonest approach (14A). 
These mouthings simultaneously probe, prove and break (Araya, 2014; Vecsey, 
1981) the adverse possession rule. First, mouthing questions or probes the apparent 
inequity in the timing rules as they relate to occupation of land to obtain title. The 
rule makes it almost impossible for squatters to obtain state lands through the 
adverse possession rule because they must occupy for a minimum of 60 years, 
whereas it is relatively easy to obtain private property based on 12 years of 
possession. Land supply is fixed, and thus people can only come into ownership 
through transfer or subdivision. The adverse possession rule implies that the state is 
abdicating its responsibility to find affordable land for its citizens and, through the 
rule, is shifting this responsibility by taking land from private owners, using taxation 
as a redistributive mechanism. Tax administrators, on the other hand, are opposing 
this action and, by resisting enforcement, are questioning the efficacy of the 
property tax rules, drawing attention to this situation in order to force the state to 
modify the rules. 
Second, tax administrators, through their mouthings, question the legitimacy of 
overturning owners’ right to their properties, a right enshrined in the Jamaican 
constitution (Allen, 1993; see Jamaican Constitution, Chapter 13: S13a, S18). 
Enforcement against squatters threatens to undermine this right. We notice a lack of 
direct confrontation with the state about this policy. TAJ’s indirect mouthing is in 
keeping with its public service practice of avoiding open confrontation and open 
dialogue that would directly challenge the imperialistic rules (Mills & Robertson, 
1974). 
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A third issue being probed by tax administrators is whether they, as 
professionals and agents of the state, would be operating ethically if they were to 
take consistent enforcement action against squatters. Consistent enforcement 
would imply that they themselves were dishonest and no different from squatters 
using the adverse possession rule to obtain property. Furthermore, through the act 
of enforcement, squatters would be able to acquire land at prices substantially 
below the market rate: 
PT is on the unimproved value. Five years’ PT is going to be less than, maybe 
less than half of the value of the land. So the state would be taking land that 
values less than half of its value and transferring it to somebody else. There is 
a level of inequity here… If the property tax effective rate was, say, 20 per 
cent of the value of the land, then after five years, PT owing would be the full 
market value of the land. So technically, the state would be taking the value 
of the land pound for pound for the tax. That would be equitable (14A). 
This case indicates criticism of the unimproved value as the tax base. If TAJ were 
to enforce compliance against squatters, it would be helping squatters to obtain land 
for as little as 50 per cent of the market value, giving them an unfair economic 
advantage. Through non-enforcement, tax administrators are ‘breaking’ the rules 
while probing and questioning use of the unimproved value as an appropriate tax 
base that allows squatters to obtain land through the adverse possession rule for 
much less than the market value. 
Metaphorically, tax administrators are ‘spinning their web through narrating’, an 
art of Anancism. Their narrating might be construed as an attack on the property tax 
and the existing social order; however, we theorize that this is not so, nor is it a drive 
toward pure chaos, but should be interpreted as a way of contesting the social order 
by unveiling the dilemmas of ethics and equity embedded in the property tax rules. 
Tax administrators adopting Anancy tactics probe these dilemmas in a roundabout 
way that is in keeping with their bureaucratic disposition to bring them indirectly to 
the fore. In doing so, they become shifters, modifiers and shapers of a new order in 
the tax field (Rampaul, 2013). 
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The new order they hope to create relates to equity in the timing rules (12 years 
for private owners and 60 years for Crown lands), protection of the rights of 
registered property owners, reviewing the adverse possession rule, and introducing 
a new tax base more in keeping with the improved value (Netzer, 1971), which 
would result in revenues that better reflect the value of services provided by the 
government. To tax administrators, the unimproved value base is ‘ridiculous and 
inequitable’ (25) and, according to a senior government bureaucrat (09), is an ‘out-
dated economic theory about land which does not coincide with the purpose of the 
property tax’. It is clear that the tax administrators’ value system or morals are 
juxtaposed or counter to that of the state, a feature of Anancism. 
After slavery, land ownership was a fundamental issue for ex-slaves. 
Missionaries assisted in obtaining land for ex-slaves, without objection from the tax 
administrators. However, difficulties arose when the environment changed and 
citizens were able to acquire land through the adverse possession rule. Tax 
administrators spoke of the older generation using the adverse possession rule to 
obtain title, but at the same time insisted that the rule ‘creates inequity and moral 
dilemmas’, which we argue inflames struggles with the state, marked by their 
resistance to the idea of enforcement against squatters. 
TAJ, a collective agent in the bureaucratic field, is dominated by the state (see 
Mills, 1990), but nonetheless resists the adverse possession rule. Rather than openly 
confronting the state through direct communication, agents opt to use taxation as 
an intervening device to push against the boundaries, rather than using taxation as a 
regulatory device to encourage squatters to become accountable and responsible. 
They achieve this by using the Anancy tactic of mouthing. Neither the adverse 
possession rule nor squatting are supported by a large section of the population, 
especially those who own land. The Anancy tactic of ‘mouthings’ form embodied 
cognitive and motivating structures, enabling TAJ to respond to squatter non-
compliance in the property tax field. Despite their knowledge of their job of 
enforcing compliance, and being empowered by the rules to do so, internalization of 
mouthings by senior tax administrators makes it natural to resist, with little or no 
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reflection on their part. They simultaneously disregard the rules through non-
enforcement on squatters.16 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The intention of this paper has been to unravel how culture shapes tax practices 
from the perspective of a developing country. Taxation is frequently viewed as a 
technical and regimented activity, but we have shown that this is not the case, 
certainly not in relation to the Jamaican property tax administration. Rather, tax 
practices in this setting are complex and dynamic and are deeply imbued with 
culture. We found evidence that tax practices are used to resist the established 
imperial order, rather than to regulate order to bring about accountability and 
responsibility among citizens, highlighting the contested nature of taxation. The 
study also reveals the slippery nature of accountability, demonstrating that tax 
practice enables agents to act in accordance with anti-hegemonic norms while 
paying lip service to hegemonic norms. We have shed light on how culture 
intervenes in tax practice, resulting in ‘selective tax enforcement’ in the tax field. 
Property tax payments are not routinely enforced on two sets of taxpayers: 
squatters and renters. Their non-payment raises issues of inequity and social justice 
in the field because the cultural norm leads to them remaining non-compliant, 
thereby condoning freeloading in that they do not pay for the state services they 
consume. 
We also conclude that culture envelops tax administrators in a web that shapes 
their knowledge, their interactions with taxpayers and the state, and their 
perspectives (Braithwaite, 2009). In addition to identifying how tax administrators 
resist the state, we have also shed light on how Anancism, an embodiment of 
Jamaican culture, continues to resist colonialism and the British imperialistic system 
through ‘evasive neutrality’ and ‘mouthing’. Through Anancy culture, tax 
administrators probe the moral basis of the property tax law, its apparent unfairness 
in awarding property to squatters well below market values, the state’s mechanism 
                                                     
16
 Such disregard for the rules by administrators may be deemed ‘unethical’ by commentators who 
fail to recognize the challenges and dilemmas of a developing country setting and the role of culture 
in administrative practices. 
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of redistributing property, and the removal of property rights from registered 
owners of property. 
Our focus on tax administrators has revealed conflicting motivations and 
actions. While inhabiting the bureaucratic field, tax administrators are expected to 
embrace norms of objectivity and disinterest. In the property tax field, however, 
other pressures prevail, such as complex interactions with land ownership rules and 
sedimented cultural influences. We find creative adaptations of enforcement 
protocols which in other settings might be viewed as contrary to the public interest, 
but which in Jamaica are consistent with national cultural traits of Anancism. 
Through Anancism, tax administrators exercise and communicate vicarious 
freedom from the property tax rules, breaking them, probing them and proving 
them. Under normal circumstances, tax administrators’ actions would be deemed 
unethical, especially by those with a worldview that neither recognizes, values nor 
understands Jamaica’s evolution and the impact of the imperialistic system imposed 
by the British hundreds of years ago that continues in the Jamaican social space 
(Chevannes, 2006). We argue that the imperialistic system ‘comprises the relevant 
laws and regulations … and reflects the larger political institutions … and the 
creators’ ideologies’ of that era (Bird, Slack, & Tassonyi, 2012: 224), which bear little 
or no relationship to Jamaica’s current situation. We therefore concur with 
Chevannes (2006: 147–148) that this creates antagonistic relationships, making 
boundary maintenance problematic, and providing fertile grounds for Anancism. We 
conclude that this setting has shaped tax administrators’ disposition to engage in 
Anancy tactics to resist the established order and the state, and to ‘exercise a level 
of independent agency’ (Bostic, 2014: 54) through non-enforcement against renters 
and squatters. 
Understanding Anancy culture provides deeper insights into the practices of tax 
administrators, to establish how they construct and generate practices in the 
property tax field that can be construed as resistance to the state. ‘Evasive 
neutrality’ and ‘mouthings’, both features of Anancism, improve understanding of 
how regular patterns of tax enforcement practices develop in the field over time 
without following rules. We see how the influence of Anancy culture produces 
practices that tend to reproduce the regularities immanent (non-compliance) in the 
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objective conditions of the field (Bourdieu, 1977: 78; Stringfellow, McMeeking, & 
Maclean, 2015). Anancy’s liminal nature provides deeper understandings of 
resistance while operating within the established order. Agents are able to do this by 
separating or distancing themselves from their original identity, placing themselves 
betwixt and between social categories and expectations; and in so doing, they are 
able to invert the hegemonic or established rules (Marshall, 2012: 31–32). This 
inversion ‘signals the reversal of the established social structure that brought about 
social unity by accepting the darker forces which other societies might try to 
eradicate’ (Marshall, 2012: 32). It also demonstrates that ‘the world is not 
constructed in binary oppositions, but is confusing, ambivalent, challenging and 
contradictory’ (Marshall, 2012: 179). 
In resisting, tax administrators simultaneously challenge and strengthen the 
social order, with a view to changing the property tax rules to make them more 
amenable to the Jamaican environment (Bird, 2015), and eventually improve 
governance over occupiers, particularly renters and squatters. It might be argued 
that this is an inappropriate way to make changes, given that Jamaica is a 
democracy. However, as Chevannes (2006: 81-82) reminds us, Jamaica is a great 
paradox. The co-existence of resistance to the established order with democracy in 
the same space is one such paradox. The two mutually feed and reinforce each 
other. Democracy is symbolic of Jamaicans’ freedom from colonialism, and elections 
serve as a great inspiration to the nation; at the same time, resistance is a powerful 
embodiment of disorder, it is Jamaicans’ ‘second nature’, and is how their freedom 
was won and changes made to the social order (Bourne, 2010; Oats et al., 2014; 
Smith, 1984). Even though slavery and colonialism have ended, Anancism continues 
and lives through its people in the form of resistance. 
The policy implications of this study are profound. The rules that dictate how 
property tax is calculated and accounted for are derived from British colonial rule. In 
the Jamaican context, the influence of culture results in local adaptations to 
practices that subvert the orderly process of assessment and collection that apply in 
other settings. Adaptations become necessary because the current property tax 
rules bear little or no relation or resemblance to Jamaican economic realities and the 
socio-political dynamics of the nation. For example, the property tax law does not 
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capture some of the current land tenure practices, politics and history of the 
Jamaican people, Jamaicans’ strong attachment or affinity to land, the relationship 
between landlords and renters, squatting, planning issues, the changing 
demographics of the nation, the social and economic plight of the vast majority of 
squatters and renters, and Jamaicans’ ambivalence to law breaking. All these are 
necessary considerations when drafting laws, and especially tax laws (Bird et al., 
2012). We argue that failure to reflect these issues in the property tax rules 
contributes to an unsuccessful property tax in Jamaica and creates antagonism in the 
field, providing ample room for Anancism and facilitating the shifting of boundaries 
between two orders (Chevannes, 2006; Marshall, 2012), a cultural practice 
associated with the nation’s history (Black, 1969; Bolland, 1996; Dawson, 2013; 
Harriott, 2003; Marshall, 2009). 
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Appendix 
Interview Schedule 
Interviewees’ Titles & Codes Interviewees’ Positions Interviewees’ Roles/Duties 
Senior Tax Administrators 
10, 14A, 14B,  16, 18, 25 
Commissioner General, Tax 
Administration Jamaica (TAJ) 
Directly answerable to the state for all 
tax matters, including property tax; 
spearheads implementation of the 
government’s tax policy; determines 
resource allocation, tax enforcement 
and compliance strategies; ensures that 
IMF revenue targets are met by TAJ 
Former Director, Inland Revenue 
Services 
Collection of all internal government 
revenues. 
Property Tax Co-ordinator Reports directly to the Commissioner 
General and is responsible for property 
tax enforcement and compliance. 
Supervises all four Regional Property 
Tax Managers in Jamaica, two of whom 
were interviewed. 
Regional Property Tax Managers (2) Report to the Property Tax Co-
ordinator. Responsible for property tax 
collection in the largest areas of 
Jamaica in terms of coverage and 
revenues. These areas include a mix of 
urban and rural parishes that account 
for the largest numbers of renters and 
squatters in the island. 
Tax Accountant Former manager of a large taxpayer 
office and former head of TAJ’s 
technical committee. 
Tax Inspectors 
26A, 26B, 26C, 26D, 26E 
Compliance Officers Property tax enforcement and 
compliance. These officers work in the 
field and interface directly with 
taxpayers. 
Politicians 
01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 
19, 20, 21, 22 
Former Prime Minister Prime Minister of Jamaica for nine 
years; formerly also minister of finance 
and member of parliament for 43 years. 
Mayor Served three terms in office and headed 
one of the largest municipalities in 
Jamaica 
Former Mayor Served one term in office and directed 
one of the largest municipalities in 
Jamaica. 
Member of Parliament Legislator, former state minister in the 
Ministry of Finance and Planning. 
Councillor Councillor in the parish of St Catherine 
Former councillor Former councillor in a rural parish. 
Minister of Local Government and 
Community Development 
Cabinet minister, spearheaded the 
entrenchment process of local 
authorities in the Jamaican constitution. 
Formulates government policies that 
encourage increased accountability and  
transparency of local authorities, as 
well as citizens’ participation. 
State Minister, Minister of Local 
Government and Community 
Development 
Cabinet minister, member of 
parliament, legislator, former deputy 
mayor and councillor in the parish of St 
Catherine. 
State Minister, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  
Cabinet minister, member of 
parliament, legislator. 
Senior Government Bureaucrats 
06,07,08,09 
Director, Revenue Enhancement, 
Ministry of Local Government and 
Community Development 
Works with local authorities to improve 
their financial position through property 
tax collections and seeking grant 
funding from local, regional and 
international bodies to support work 
programmes and projects. 
Senior Consultant, Ministry of Local 
Government and Community 
Development 
Consultant on local government 
matters, including fiscal 
decentralization. 
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Finance Director, National Solid Waste 
Management Authority (NSWMA); 
Manages the financial operations of 
NSWMA and its four regional entities. 
Director, National Land Agency (NLA) Has oversight of the Land Registry and 
Land Valuations and assignment of 
values to properties. Reports to the 
Commissioner of Lands. 
Senior Local Government Managers/ 
Officers 
17A, 17B, 23A, 23B 
Manager, Corporate Services Manages human resources and finances 
in a large municipality. 
Manager, Corporate Services Manages enforcement of and 
compliance with all laws, including 
property tax, in one local authority; 
interfaces with TAJ re property tax 
enforcement and compliance. 
Municipal Engineer Approval of building plans, etc. 
Chief Administration Manager Oversight and management of all Parish 
Council activities in a designated local 
authority. 
Taxpayers 
27, 28A, 28B, 29, 30, 31A, 31B, 31C, 
31D, 31E, 31F, 32,33 
Squatters Squatters for between 30 and 40 years. 
Residents of a squatter community in 
the parish of St Catherine. 
Homeowners and former renters Residents of various  communities in 
the parishes of St Catherine and 
Kingston and St Andrew. All except one 
of these taxpayers are former renters. 
Corporate Services 
35, 36 
Board Member and Manager Developer from West Indies Home 
Contractors, the largest housing 
developer in Jamaica since the 1950s. 
Hereditament Manager Manager of Housing Co-op. Pays 
property tax on behalf of home owners 
or collects property tax from home-
owners and remits it to TAJ. 
Civil Society 
24A, 24A 
PCAC Members Members of the Portmore Citizens’ 
Advisory Committee, a watchdog 
organization for citizens.  
Total number of participants 45 Total number of interviews 32  
 
Compiled by first author (Source: fieldwork notes and data) 
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